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Economic growth, innovation systems, and institutional change: 
“A Trilogy in Five Parts”∇ 
 
Saeed Parto1 
Tommaso Ciarli2 
Saurabh Arora 3 
 
Abstract 
Development and growth are products of the interplay and interaction among 
heterogeneous actors operating in specific institutional settings. There is a much alluded-to, 
but under-investigated, link between economic growth, innovation systems, and institutions.  
There is widespread agreement among most economists on the positive reinforcing link 
between innovation and growth. However, the importance of institutions as catalysts in this 
link has not been adequately examined.  The concept of innovation systems has the potential 
to fill this gap. But these studies have not conducted in-depth institutional analyses or 
focussed on institutional transformation processes, thereby failing to link growth theory to 
the substantive institutional tradition in economics. In this paper we draw attention to the 
main shortcomings of orthodox and heterodox growth theories, some of which have been 
addressed by the more descriptive literature on innovation systems. Critical overviews of the 
literatures on growth and innovation systems are used as a foundation to propose a new 
perspective on the role of institutions and a framework for conducting institutional analysis 
using a multi-dimensional typology of institutions. The framework is then applied to cases of 
Taiwan and South Korea to highlight the instrumental role played by institutions in 
facilitating and curtailing economic development and growth. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The reliance in mainstream economics on formal, model-based argumentation led 
Wassily Leontief in 1971 to state: “uncritical enthusiasm for mathematical formulation…[in 
economics means that] anyone capable of learning elementary, or preferably advanced 
calculus and algebra, and acquiring acquaintance with the specialized terminology of 
economics can set himself up as a theorist” (quoted in Smelser and Swedberg 1994:7). While 
Leontief’s statement may hold true for a large portion of scholarly output in economic theory, 
neither we, and we think, nor Leontief and most other critics of mainstream economics are of 
the opinion that there is no value in economic theorising using a formal tool-kit. It is our 
premise, however, that there is a great potential and need for bridging the gap between formal 
economic analysis and the more contextual details of economic activity that require qualitative 
analysis. We see an opportunity to realize this potential given the proliferation over the last 
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two decades of writings in evolutionary economics and innovation systems: the embedded 
nature of economic activity, and the emphasis on the role of “institutions” in these literatures. 
In this paper we aim to provide a set of interpretive tools that allow a more context-specific 
understanding of the processes underlying industrial development and growth. 
The notion of growth as employed in traditional neo-classical economics focuses largely 
on changes in GDP without paying adequate attention to structural changes manifest in the 
continuous (re)organization of the economic system. Such an approach provides little insights 
into the causal relations that drive the development and growth processes. Economic 
historians, relying on detailed narratives, are generally more successful in capturing these 
causal relations than economists working with sophisticated mathematical tools to analyze 
quantifiable observations of complex socioeconomic phenomena. Although some 
mainstream economists have relied on “stylised facts”4 to justify the assumptions of their 
growth models, the empirical implications of narrative-based approaches are, in our view, 
more significant: A narrative-based approach can capture the substantial deviations in the 
development process and in the object of analysis, i.e., a national economy. Economic 
historians explain qualitative change and development in a “localized” context to highlight 
such context-specific features as formal and informal institutions, socio-cultural 
idiosyncrasies, creation/diffusion of technological knowledge, and the structural landscape. If 
growth is that idealization of economic dynamics in which things simply get bigger or smaller 
or stay the same size (Dosi et al. 1994), growth models are merely the final representations of 
these changes and thus inadequate to account for the range of dynamic processes that 
underlie industrial development. 
This is by no means a novel observation. The link between development and growth 
has been the subject of analysis for scholars of structural change, regulation theory, 
institutional economics, and innovation systems. There is also a small but significant body of 
work on social capital that combines elements from history, sociology, economic geography, 
politics, and anthropology to account for the unevenness of development and growth 
globally.5 The shared premise of these alternate approaches is that growth should not, and 
cannot, be analysed from an aggregate perspective alone. As Wood (1994:66) argues, relatively 
rapid micro structural changes precede the slower macro developments. Growth is not the 
sum total of factors that drive development but the interactions between “conditions” and 
“elements” that co-evolve to generate growth. The elements represent the micro (and part 
meso) dimension while the conditions are the macro (and part meso) variables. 
In other words, one needs to understand the micro-underpinnings of the macro 
variables and their interaction with one another in specific socio-cultural and political 
contexts to fully account for growth. In a similar vein, von Tunzelmann (1995:16) states, “to 
understand industrialization thus requires a multi–dimensional approach: the process of 
industrialisation cannot be collapsed into a single dimension, as is done in orthodox 
economics.” If, for example, at the aggregate level growth can be expressed through a 
                                                 
4 The notion of “stylised facts” was apparently first introduced by Kaldor during the Conference of the 
International Economic Association in Corfu in 1958. He suggested the use of stylised facts to refer to 
phenomena which have been observed in a vast number of circumstances and thus deserve being explained or 
tested as hypotheses. 
5 See, for example, Jacobs (1961), Bourdieu (1983), Coleman (1988), and Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000). 
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production function, in which two or three elements appear, one cannot do away with an 
explanation of the dynamics that lead to changes in the elements of the production function if 
one is concerned with an understanding of growth processes. To accomplish this task 
effectively, one must depart from “aggregate growth” as the primary object of analysis to 
examine the interactions between the different factors of production in a given context. This 
perspective is all the more important if one seeks to understand the development processes 
that lead to growth. 
The link between development and growth can be understood through an investigation 
of the interconnected “deepest causes” of development together with the “proximate 
sources” of growth (Abramovitz 1989).6 Any in-depth examination along these lines requires 
a disaggregation of the growth process without assuming representative agents and their 
return on capital with homogeneous output; or the assumed dynamics of technological 
progress stemming from increasing returns, non-competitive markets and spillover effects. 
Such assumptions of homogeneity eliminate the possibility of explaining the trap of 
underdevelopment, or the “miracle” of rapid development by newly industrialized countries 
such as Taiwan and South Korea. 
Developed and newly industrialized economies have undergone multiple processes of 
industrial and institutional transformation. As Kuznets (1966) observed, the start of a new 
economic epoch after the industrial revolution signalled the emergence of a fundamentally 
different structure in the world system of production and consumption. As a result, 
significant changes took place in the sectoral composition of industrializing economies, 
relations among countries, and in the alignment of advances in science and technology. This 
process went hand in hand with changes in national institutional arrangements. Examples of 
institutional transformation include the establishment of credit markets, (intellectual) property 
rights’ regimes, human rights and well-being standards, citizens’ involvement, and a 
proliferation of private and public networks expressive of a diverse set of interests and, most 
importantly, government intervention.7 
In traditional neo-classical growth theory technical change is “simply” modelled with a 
shift in the production function that represents the adoption of a more productive 
technology. But as Ayres (1962:125-54) argued, “technology is essentially an autonomous, 
self-sustaining process,… the potential for fruitful discoveries will be enhanced in a receptive 
environment” (cited in Street [1987:1883]). In a similar vein, Fagerberg and Verspagen 
(2002:2) note, “technological catch-up is not a question of replacing an outdated 
technological set up with a new one, but to continually transform technological, economic 
and institutional structures.” In order to understand why this continual transformation does 
not occur in countries where it is most needed, one must construct narratives of the political 
                                                 
6 Abramovitz’s proximate sources of growth include technological change, economies of scale, human and 
tangible capital accumulation (Abramovitz 1993). 
7 There is an extensive stream of literature in mainstream growth theory from the last decade that uses 
institutions as a link between income distribution and economic growth. For a general overview of this literature, 
see Benabou (1996). These studies have investigated the relationship of growth to educational systems (human 
capital) (see for example, Glomm and Ravikumar 1992) and credit market imperfections (Galor and Zeira 1993); 
and to voting mechanisms or political stability/conflict (see Persson and Tabellini 1994; Perotti 1993). As the 
bulk of this literature does not focus on industrial/technological change, a review is out of the scope of this 
paper. 
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economy which combine historical descriptions with a re-articulation of stylised facts to 
simultaneously grasp the “how’s” and the “why’s”: the creation and diffusion of new 
technologies depends on pre-existing milieus (Street 1987). As we will show later, the 
advancements made by Taiwan and South Korea toward becoming newly industrialized 
economies have been firmly embedded in pre-existing milieus, or the integrated webs of 
formal and informal institutions, which served as the foundation for policy and planning for 
socio-economic transformation. In countries where appropriate pre-existing milieus are not 
present they can be “engineered” (Putnam 1993), through capability-enhancing national and 
international measures including favourable terms of trade, appropriate property rights 
regimes, and development aid, 8 all of which seem to have played key roles in the 
development of Taiwan and South Korea. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide a critical overview of 
prominent growth models in the orthodox tradition of economics, and in two heterodox 
traditions, namely evolutionary economics and the structuralist/Kaldorian approaches. In 
Section 3, we provide a synthesis of the more descriptive, and more encompassing, literature 
on innovation systems. Here we discuss how the oft-neglected analysis of the transformation 
of innovation systems is necessary from the perspective of developing economies. In section 
4, we present a methodology for analysing institutions and the institutional context in studies 
of development and growth. We briefly discuss how this methodology may be applied using 
examples from the history of economic development in South Korea and Taiwan. We 
conclude in section 5 and explore future directions for research on the development process 
in a context-rich and institutionally sensitive manner. 
 
2.0 Growth Theorising 
Economists have traditionally focused on formalizing growth processes where the 
“expansion”9 of aggregate GDP is related to the expansion of aggregate inputs, which are 
influenced by other variables that determine both input expansion and their impact on 
growth. Most growth models possess these ‘mechanisms’ of relating ‘inputs’ to ‘outputs’ using 
simplified causal relations, and therefore have an appeal to the policy maker who prefers 
things in a ‘nutshell’. Over the last two decades, however, different ways for treating 
economic growth in formalized terms have emerged. These approaches differ from traditional 
growth theory in their choice of assumptions, levels of aggregation, the relevant mechanisms 
studied, and mathematical representation. This large range of approaches has brought us to 
the point where, as stated by Wood (1994), each of us already has a basic model which serves 
as a background for any analysis. However, many models are not extended to take into 
account, or not be in contradiction with, the stylised facts presented by the history of 
economic development and growth.10 
                                                 
8 Here we are referring to scientific, technological, and organizational capabilities that underlie technological 
development. These capabilities manifest at social (individual), organizational, and societal levels (see section 5.1 
below for more details on these levels).  
9 ‘Expansion’ is used by Wood (1994) in contraposition to ‘change’. 
10 For a specific example, see Jones (1995) who points out that the “scale effects” prediction of most R&D-
based growth models finds little empirical support. 
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In this section, we first review the orthodox approaches to growth and some of the 
improvements made by the New Growth Theory (NGT), which although important remain 
“technical in nature” (Aghion and Howitt 1994:118). We then link some fundamental 
critiques of the orthodox models with main elements of heterodox approaches that attempt, 
in various ways, to open the black box of aggregate entities and analyse some of the 
underlying mechanisms (e.g. heterogeneous economic agents, endogenous technological 
innovation, non-homogenous demand, cumulative processes, and the like). Through these 
brief reviews we aim to underline the need to account for the role of institutions, which 
constitute the environment in which the disaggregated elements interact and (co-)evolve. 
 
2.1 Orthodox Growth Models: a fallacious endogenisation of technical change and 
consumption? 
Most mainstream growth models, until the emergence of the New Growth Theories, 
have been macroeconomic models within a ‘dynamic general equilibrium’ framework. That is, 
at any point in time, all variables are assumed to adjust to values which maintain the system in 
a state where demand and supply sides match: no market adjustment process is considered 
other than immediate changes in prices. The functional relation between the determinants of 
growth and their result, at the aggregate level, is presented in the form of an aggregate Cobb-
Douglas production function:11 each country produces one homogenous output with two 
homogenous inputs, labour and capital.12 This representation was first articulated in the 
Solow-Swan model (Solow 1956; 1957; Swan 1956). The Cobb-Douglas function has well-
known limitations in its underlying assumptions (see for example Robinson 1953 and 
Pasinetti 1966).13 Second, the Solow-Swan model relies on the experiences of industrialised 
countries, and has little relevance for less developed economies.14 Third, there is no 
explanation of a main driver of growth: technical change.15 Fourth, empirical evidence of 
long-run convergence among countries with different initial levels of GDP, as suggested by 
the Solow-Swan model, has not been found (Lucas 1988, Romer 1986). Convergence is only 
conceivable in a world where technological change is exogenous and available to all countries: 
                                                 
11 In contrast, the post-Keynesian Harrod-Domar model (Domar 1946, Harrod 1949) is represented using a 
Leontief fixed coefficients function. 
12 The only difference in output allowed is in quantity, but never in quality. That is, the technological factor 
introduced by Solow allows for shifts in the linear production function in the form of process changes only. 
13 To name a few, perfect substitution between production factors, decreasing returns to scale, perfect 
reversibility of inputs, knowledge as a public good, perfect competitiveness of markets, price-based interactions, 
perfect information, and validity of Say’s law. Further, drawing from Sylos (2000), the fallacies of using the 
Cobb-Douglas function include, i) defining a monotonic relation between rate of profits and capital per capita 
(Pasinetti 1966); ii) given prices; iii) firms being in a position to minimise costs; iv) all capital goods readily 
aggregable and substitutable; v) ready availability of all production techniques and their combinations. Finally, no 
difference is postulated between ‘available process frontier’ and ‘fundamental production frontier’ (David 1975). 
14 See, for example, Coombs (1987) and Easterly (2002). 
15 Solow (1994b) argues that exogenous technical change is not a serious drawback and endogenising it is not so 
useful as it does not really add to our understanding of growth, at least not in the way it is endogenised by the 
New Growth Theory: “The new-growth-theory treatment of endogenous technical progress is pretty crude, it 
certainly does not come close to describe what happens in economic research and there is no reason to suppose 
it is much better on technological research. There are scholars who look closely at what goes on in industrial 
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Neither of these two assumptions allows for an explanation of the observed divergent growth 
rates (Romer 1994). Fifth, how can growth be sustained if its main determinants are 
exogenous? If both population growth and technical change are considered exogenous, there 
can actually be no role for policy intervention (Arrow 1962; Romer 1989). 
Some drawbacks of the traditional orthodox growth theory have been addressed by the 
proponents of the NGT. Their main contribution has been to introduce different 
mechanisms of endogenous increase in the technological factor and drop the assumption of 
diminishing returns to investment at the aggregate level. Thus, markets can be non-strictly 
competitive, and the radical marginalist assumption that all the production factors are paid 
through their marginal private productivity is abandoned. In addition, a certain degree of 
disaggregation is introduced to account for the behaviour of firms (in R&D growth models 
such as Romer 1990; Aghion and Howitt 1992); and consumers in allocation of resources, 
thereby endogenising the rates of investment and saving. Nonetheless, the basic assumptions 
of perfect rationality, homogeneity of consumers (Ramsey (1928) type inter-temporal 
consumption), and the use of a representative agent cast doubts on the contribution of NGT 
in understanding growth and development. 
The different NGT models may be broadly classified according to the primary 
mechanisms they use to explain endogenous growth. Amable and Guellec (1992) distinguish 
between four broad categories of growth models: i) investment in capital, accumulating at a 
national level though externalities (Romer 1986); ii) public goods, also in terms of investment at 
the aggregate economy level (Barro 1990); iii) accumulation of human capital (Lucas 1988); and 
iv) technological innovation as a systematic activity – often manifest as R&D – introduced in 
different forms by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1989), and Aghion and Howitt 
(1992) among others. Each of these categories is used to explain how growth can be sustained 
socially, even if the returns to private investments are diminishing. In other words, models are 
used to explain why aggregate returns to capital are constant. NGT models simply show that 
economic growth can be analytically represented in several ways, all providing quite similar 
results under strict parameterisations, suggesting that the different explanations are equally 
plausible. If this is the case, which of the above explanations, and set of assumptions, for an 
endogenous increase in the technological factor should be picked and why?  
NGT has made important contributions to formal growth theory, articulating some 
representations of the underlying processes of development, but the fact remains that too 
many critical features of the economic system are treated as “given” within this literature. 
There is little recognition of the context-specific “non-economic” factors affecting economic 
activity, such as those highlighted by economic historians in different regional settings 
(Easterly 2002). In the NGT framework there is no evolution, no characterisation of agents 
leading up to aggregate behaviour, and no allowance for out-of-equilibrium dynamics. 
Further, the conceptual drawbacks of the use of Cobb-Douglas production function are not 
addressed (see note 13 above). The aggregation of supply (or a homogenous disaggregation) 
does not provide insight into the widely observed processes of structural change and 
industrial dynamics. Finally, the homogenisation of demand restricts an analysis of its role in 
economic development and growth. 
                                                                                                                                                   
research centres and they think they are achieving some understanding [of growth]. Maybe so, but it does not 
seem sharp enough to be embodied in a model”(Solow 1994a: 378). 
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NGT does not provide a causal explanation of how technological change emerges or 
how it affects economic development and growth. Assumptions of representative firms, 
industrial sectors and/or institutions hide the real process of technological development 
under the veil of homogeneity. No account of the differences between various industrial 
sectors, firms, and institutions as structuring phenomena is made: differences in the 
technology used/produced and demand elasticity of outputs across sectors are crucial in 
explaining divergent developmental patterns.16 Finally, the “representative” rational individual 
assumption of NGT has been time and again persuasively challenged by a number of scholars 
(see for example Simon 1981; Conlisk 1996). 
In the foregoing, we have discussed the main features and limitations of orthodox 
theory in understanding development and growth processes, especially at ‘disaggregated’ 
levels. The NGT is clearly an advance through its exploration of different patterns of 
endogenous growth including market imperfections and technological change. However, 
sources of technological development and the diversity of behaviour underlying these sources 
are largely neglected by mainstream theorists. 
 
2.2 Firms, Technological Change, Demand, and Institutions: Heterodox Approaches 
There is a large divide between the orthodox models’ representation of economic 
growth and the development dynamics that drive it. While some major determinants of 
growth are considered in both theoretical modelling and empirical analyses, they are subject 
to a theoretical representation which does not allow an analysis of underlying mechanisms 
and heterogeneity. Technical change is treated as a driver of growth, however the way in 
which technical change occurs is not explored with sufficient attention to the micro-, firm-
level economic activity.17 In neo-classical theory, microeconomic phenomena are portrayed as 
stable at the macro level leading to an analysis of the allocation of resources at the macro level 
without analyzing changes in production and technical innovation at the firm level. 
Some economists have attempted to address the shortcomings of the orthodox 
perspective on growth. Following Nelson and Winter (1982), evolutionary economists have 
built growth models focusing on the dynamics of firm-level and/or sector-level activity 
(focusing mainly on the supply side) and the consequences of these dynamics for the whole 
economy (see for example, Silverberg and Verspagen 1994; Fagiolo and Dosi 2003). Some 
evolutionary and other approaches have also emphasized the role of demand as 
complementary to the evolution of production patterns and micro-level behaviour. These 
perspectives include some level of disaggregation of economic entities, and allow for their 
heterogeneity in the analysis. Given this disaggregation, the development dynamic is 
interpreted as an unbalanced out-of-equilibrium process. Below we group and briefly consider 
two streams of this literature: the evolutionary approach to growth and technological change; 
and the “cumulative causation” theories developed within the neo-Keynesian framework. 
                                                 
16 On sectoral patterns of innovation see Malors (1997) and Pavitt’s (1984) seminal work; on the role of sectors 
in growth see for example, Pasinetti (1981), Verspagen (1993) and Fagerberg (2000); on the relationship between 
sectors and demand elasticity in north-south growth models, see Cimoli and Soete (1992). On the role of firm 
organisation on development patterns, see for example von Tunzelman (1995). 
17 Attention to micro-, firm-level economic activity is more adequately addressed in the evolutionary economics 
tradition beginning with Nelson and Winter (1982) and the innovation systems literature discussed below. 
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2.2.1 Evolutionary Growth Models: The Supply Side of Growth 
The process of economic growth, in broad terms, may be viewed as the product of the 
interactions between three main factors: productivity growth, demand, and co-ordination 
forces (Metcalfe, Foster, and Ramlogan 2002). Each of these factors is itself a product of 
interactions among heterogeneous forces at lower levels of analysis. The macro, aggregated 
factors can be derived from the micro-level processes, but the inverse is far more difficult to 
achieve (Carlsson and Eliasson 2003:435). The evolutionary approach takes the firm as its 
unit of analysis and focuses on the dynamics of firms’ behaviour as the micro foundation of 
macro phenomena, while assuming bounded rationality and heterogeneity of agents. In 
addition, the evolutionary approach assumes continual emergence of novelty in ideas and 
agents as products of variation and selection processes (Dosi 1988). 
The pioneering work of Nelson and Winter (1982) treats the firm as the primary agent 
of technical change, and thus the main driving force for growth. As discussed above, NGT 
models also consider technical change to be the driver of growth, but represent it in an 
abstract way with no account of the heterogeneous, non-maximising behaviour at the firm 
level. In contrast, Nelson and Winter (1982) apply an appreciative understanding of firms’ 
‘routine’ behaviour for building a model that focuses on innovation as a relative (behavioural) 
response to market conditions. 
An important contribution of evolutionary growth theory is the central role of 
technological change within firms and the related novelty generation.18 Two types of models 
can be distinguished within evolutionary economics: models which account for embodied 
innovations occurring with investment in capital; and models which consider disembodied 
technical change occurring due to direct R&D efforts of the firms. The way in which 
disembodied technical change is modelled can vary widely as it is a result of complex dynamic 
interactions between different types of knowledge and its application within different firms. 
Usually, a part of the innovation process is stochastic, but cumulative features of knowledge 
accumulation are also taken into account. Some models have introduced firm-learning in 
innovation routines, in both quantity and direction, which determines changes in R&D 
strategies of firms.  
It must be noted that if one moves away from the simplifying assumptions of neo-
classical theory, the articulation of economic phenomena through mathematical modelling 
becomes more difficult. Similarly, once one assumes non-optimizing behaviour, a convincing 
account of satisficing behaviour needs to be developed. One may use the analogy of routines 
as “genetic” rules that characterise and differentiate firms’ behaviour (Nelson and Winter 
1982). But, it is still important to find a set of regularities which bounds the variety of 
routines. As we argue later, these regularities become manifest through an array of formal and 
informal institutions. 
                                                 
18 It is important to note that analysing technological change has a long tradition in economics, viewed as a 
dominant variable in processes of development and wealth creation since the industrial revolution. That it has 
been set aside after the contributions of Marx is probably due to an “historical accident”. According to Pasinetti 
(1994), “…the roots of the appalling inadequacy of modern economic theory to investigate technical progress 
lies in a peculiar perverse accumulation of misjudgements made by the economic profession at crucial junctures 
in the development of economic theory when, for analytical reasons, a choice seemed necessary between equally 
possible, but alternative, lines of investigation” (Pasinetti 1994:2). 
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According to Silverberg and Verspagen (1995: 18), evolutionary views have increased 
our understanding of development and growth processes only to a limited extent: “…in the 
sense that they do not provide insight into exactly which factors play which role in the growth 
process.” Nonetheless, the evolutionary perspective does provide a more in-depth 
understanding of the interactions between micro-behaviour and macro-emergent properties. 
This is important for exploring the dynamics of structural change at the macro level, the 
changes in industrial configurations, the incentives driving firm-level innovation, and the role 
of the institutional environment. This heterodox approach is more grounded in the complex 
reality of the economic system and provides us with some means to account for micro-level 
phenomena where stochastic events play a significant role. 
 
2.2.2 Structuralist/Kaldorian Growth Models: The Demand Side of Growth 
In line with the Keynesian tradition, Kaldor (1966), 19 and others, 20 emphasized the role 
of demand in economic development and growth. He based a substantial part of his 
reasoning on the concept of cumulative causation, which he used to relate the interplay 
between demand patterns, investment decisions, vintage capital, and productivity growth. 
Economic output increases through investments in sectors that induce increasing returns, 
which are in turn spurred by an increase in the demand for the goods they produce. In 
particular, Kaldor (1966) underlines three different processes that constitute demand in the 
economy: consumption, capital investment, and export demand. In simple terms, given the 
increasing returns to investment, growth is higher if internal consumption concentrates on 
sectors with higher returns and faster technical progress. A high demand elasticity with 
respect to international income from the goods produced by the sectors leads to a higher 
productive efficiency, which in turn should increase demand through a reduction in output 
price. Two parameters play a crucial role in Kaldor’s perspective: income elasticity, an 
aggregate feature; and technical productivity, a firm- and sector-dependent micro (meso) 
feature. 
Using a similar approach, Pasinetti (1981) attempts to understand growth as a function 
of sectoral interaction and change, representing the economy as composed of different 
vertically related sectors each with its own autonomous production process. If different 
sectors are assumed to be ordered in a vertical configuration, the final sector constitutes the 
final demand, and at the same time provides the labour input to all sectors of the system. 
Unlike the orthodox approach, Pasinetti’s (1981) model does not assume a system in 
perpetual equilibrium. Instead, he models a dynamic system in which the intersectoral forces 
can keep the economy in a continuous out-of-equilibrium state. Equilibrium is only reached if 
all sectors produce at full capacity and there is full employment (which is not assumed). 
Hence, growth rates of individual sectors can be different, following labour and technological 
dynamics. This allows one to picture a shift in the economic system and its structural change. 
Second, no unlimited growth or steady state occurs due to changing demand conditions for 
                                                 
19 See also the model in Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962). 
20 The line can actually be traced back to development scholars such as Hirschman (1958), Myrdal (1957), 
Prebish (1950), and Singer (1950), who developed important concepts such as effects of industrial linkages, 
cumulative causation and terms of trade traps. 
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each good. When the demand is met, either a shift in the sectoral composition occurs or there 
is a reduction in the supply of labour. 
The structure of Pasinetti’s model provides important insights into the composition of 
an economic system and how it affects development. The model can be used to understand 
differences in patterns of development across countries, or investigate the relevance of 
different patterns of technical change across sectors, or examine the consequences of internal 
and external demand shifts. In other words, it provides a ‘meso’ level interpretation of 
economic change and development, that complements (or may be complemented) with the 
‘micro’ (supply side) approach of evolutionary understanding, and the more ‘macro’ 
cumulative causation perspective. 
Following Pasinetti, some evolutionary models that endogenise technical change at the 
sectoral level have been able to relate growth patterns of the economic system to sectoral 
restructuring, country specialisation and international trade dynamics.21 Their macro-
framework is based on the balance of payment theory developed by Thirlwall (1979) – a 
formalisation of Kaldorian propositions on international demand and growth. Further, the 
economic system is composed of different open economies specialised in different sectors, 
each producing a different good with a different demand elasticity (in national or international 
market), and each with its own labour productivity. Thus, technological development, trade, 
price and wage dynamics in the different countries, composed of different sectors, affect their 
relative competitiveness and rate of growth. Both selection and innovation occur through 
sectoral evolution and technical change is predominantly deterministic, following a ‘Kaldor-
Verdoorn’ law. The micro behaviour however is not specified. 
In an attempt to bridge the micro insights of evolutionary modelling and the Kaldorian 
macro framework, Dosi et al. (1994) extend Kaldor’s (1966) approach to consider different 
levels of aggregation together in a multi country setting. In their model, each country is 
composed of two sectors, each with its own set of firms. Further attempts in this direction 
have been made by Lorentz (2004), and Saviotti and Pyka (2004). Although these models are 
able to consistently link the different levels of aggregation in an economic system, they are 
unable to provide an explanation of the way in which the dynamics underlying the 
development processes are organised. Institutional settings, in which these dynamics occur 
and which spur or retard the dynamics, are better explained by alternate narrative-based 
approaches. These approaches emphasize context-specificity and the micro- (and meso-) level 
organization of innovative activity as two key elements determining growth. Such an 
approach developed by the innovation systems (IS) literature underlines the instrumental role of 
context-specificity but does not, as we argue in the next section, fully account for institutions 
and institutional change, hence fails to make the obvious link to the substantive 
institutionalist literature in economics.  
 
3.0 Innovation Systems 
A group of scholars including heterodox economists, economic geographers, and 
regional planners have developed the multi-scale concept of “innovation systems” to 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Cimoli (1994), Los and Verspagen (2003), Verspagen (1993), and Verspagen (2002). A 
similar approach which also yields similar conclusions is the “technology gap approach” applied by Fagerberg 
(1987). 
 11
highlight the importance of specific institutions and technological and organizational learning 
processes in economic development. Formal institutions, supporting technological and 
organizational innovation in firms, are central in this rapidly-growing stream of literature. 
However, these studies employ the notion of institutions with multiple interpretations and to 
varying degrees of lucidity. Most studies have focused on mapping the set of formal 
institutions which are crucial for successful innovative performance of a region/nation. Little 
emphasis is placed on dynamic analyses of system transformation and institutional change, 
which are essential from an economic development perspective. 
Since its emergence in the late 1980s, the innovation systems concept has become one 
of the most popular frameworks to study technological innovation among economists and 
policy scholars. According to a recent literature survey, around 750 studies have been 
published on the subject, with half of them taking the National Innovation System (NIS) as 
their unit of analysis (Carlsson 2004). The other half is evenly divided among studies on 
Regional Innovation Systems (RIS)22 and sectoral/technological innovation systems. In this 
paper we will focus on the NIS literature. In the first part of this section, we provide an 
outline of the basic building blocks of the NIS concept as identified by its prominent 
proponents. The second part focuses on the definition and analysis of ‘institutions’ in the IS 
framework. The third part is a brief critique of the innovation systems literature in addressing 
issues of economic development from a dynamic systems perspective. 
 
3.1 National Innovation Systems: An Overview 
The pioneering studies on the concept of ‘national systems of innovation’ are due to 
Lundvall (1988), Nelson (1988) and Freeman (1987). The innovation systems framework 
captures the social character of the innovation process by embedding the innovative efforts 
of individual firms in networks of relationships with other organisations such as supplier 
firms, universities, research centres, government departments, financial institutions and end-
users.23 The new knowledge required for innovation is generally created through joint efforts 
of the above knowledge generating actors operating in an institutional setting and with the 
support of formal institutional actors. This emphasis on “learning by interacting” is one of 
the cornerstones of the IS framework. Determinants of the diffusion of new knowledge or 
technologies into an economy are also included in a broad conceptualisation of the 
innovation system (see Lundvall et al. 2002; Edquist 1997). The emphasis on the ‘national’ 
scale stems from the understanding that the institutional contexts in which new knowledge is 
produced/diffused, and technological specialisation patterns, tend to differ across national 
borders.24 In addition, adopting this scale of analysis allows one to examine the impact of and 
implications for innovation policies framed at the national scale. Finally, NIS scholars 
advocate that the concept and framework should be kept relatively diffuse and general so as 
                                                 
22 See Doloreux and Parto (2005) for a critical overview of this literature.  
23 The term innovation generally refers to technological innovation, however some authors have characterised 
innovation more broadly to include organisational innovations.  
24 This is doesn’t imply that the NIS is not affected by the globally organized economic and research system, but 
highlights the importance of knowledge creation capabilities that need to be built in local firms through national 
policy focus and other institutional mechanisms for sustained economic growth. 
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to allow adaptation to different contexts and regions (Lundvall 1992; Edquist 1997; Arocena 
and Sutz 2000). 
The widespread diffusion of the NIS concept among students of innovation was given 
a crucial stimulus by the publication of two books in the early 1990s.  The first book edited by 
Lundvall (1992) was an attempt to theoretically develop the national innovation systems 
framework further. The second book edited by Nelson (1993) adopted the complementary 
approach of empirical analysis by presenting case studies of innovation systems in fifteen 
countries. Our outline of the theoretical elements of the NIS concept is largely derived from 
the work done by Lundvall and his colleagues at Aalborg. 
According to Lundvall et al. (2002), four theoretical elements were combined together 
to develop the national system of innovation concept:  
“the neo-Schumpeterian reinterpretation of national production systems, empirical work 
based on the home-market theory of international trade, the microeconomic approach to 
innovation as an interactive process inspired by research at SPRU and, finally, insights in 
the role of institutions shaping innovative activities.” (Lundvall et al. 2002: 216-217) 
The national production systems concept has its roots in the French and Scandinavian 
structural economics tradition, where an economy is seen as a system rather than just a simple 
co-existence of different sectors. This literature pays significant attention to forward and 
backward linkages of producing units (see Cooke and Morgan 1998 and Kemp et al. 2000 for 
a synthesis of some of these concepts). The second element points to the nature of demand 
in an economy which partly shapes the technological specialisation pattern in small 
industrially developed countries, for example the Danish specialisation in dairy processing 
machinery (Andersen and Lundvall 1988).25  The interactive learning element entered the NIS 
concept because of substantial empirical evidence collected in the 1970s and 80s showing that 
innovation was strongly dependent on co-operation and co-ordination among a group of 
heterogeneous actors. ‘Learning by interacting’ was added to Arrow’s (1962) ‘learning by 
doing’ and Rosenberg’s (1982) ‘learning by using’ as an important factor in innovative 
performance of firms (Lundvall 1992). The fourth element in Lundvall at al.’s (2002) 
conceptualization refers to formal and informal institutions that form the context in which 
the interactive learning takes place (see also Johnson 1992; Edquist and Johnson 1997 for 
discussions on institutions in NIS literature). Here institutions are generally treated as distinct 
from other market or non-market organisations. 
In order to appreciate the scope of the NIS concept, it is important to understand the 
main components of a NIS. The starting point for Lundvall (1988) is the set of firms and 
their linkages in a national system of production. Technological and organisational 
competence is built in this system through learning and generation of new knowledge which, 
together with appropriate institutionalization processes can signal the emergence of a national 
system of innovation. According to Lundvall (1992), the sub-systems to be included in the 
analysis and the boundary of the system must be left open as they will differ in different 
settings and applications. However, in general terms, one may consider the following 
organisational bodies as crucial elements of a national system of innovation:  
                                                 
25 One may also consider the natural resource endowments or features of a small country as partial determinants 
for the nature of demand and the pattern of technological specialisation. A case in point is Sweden which 
developed a strong wood-processing machinery sector. 
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• Firms including organisations such as consortia of firms or sub-units of firms such as 
industrial R&D laboratories 
• Universities as sources of trained personnel and basic science 
• Government sponsorred research centres as crucial catalysers of private-public 
interactions 
• Investment banks and other supporting organisations in financial sector such as 
venture capital firms 
• Relevant regulatory bodies such as patent offices or national/local government 
departments 
• End-users, including public procurement by the government 
The efficiency of a NIS is history-contingent and depends on the competence of these 
organisations in producing (and absorbing) new knowledge, and adapting to a rapidly 
changing external environment. It also depends on the nature of evolution of the structure 
and efficacy of inter-organizational links within the system as knowledge is accumulated, and 
to cope with changing pressures from the external environments. Finally, the adaptation of 
the institutional context is fundamental in facilitating learning processes for efficient 
functioning of a NIS.  
 
3.2 Institutions in National Innovation Systems 
According to Nelson (2002: 265), the “innovation systems idea is an institutional 
conception, par excellence.” Most researchers in the NIS stream consider the role of 
institutions as central in an innovation system (Edquist 1997). References are made to 
institutions that facilitate and support technological innovation in most analyses of NIS 
(Johnson and Edquist 1997). However, we have not come across NIS studies that perform an 
in-depth analysis of institutions and institutional change.26 
NIS scholars have historically associated different meanings with the term ‘institutions’. 
A part of this literature views all types of organisational structures, including firms, 
universities and R&D laboratories, and technology policy as institutions (see for example, 
Nelson and Rosenberg 1993; Niosi et al. 1993; Pavitt and Patel 1994; Niosi 2002). In this 
conception, firms and their R&D laboratories (as institutions), and other non-market 
institutions supporting innovation, with linkages among them and the interactions between 
the institutions and their environments, can create an innovation system. Coherence between 
the diverse institutions is therefore essential for an IS to be efficient, and positive feedback 
between the different interrelated institutions is required to strengthen them. The importance 
of behavioural and other informal institutions such as the nature of trust and cultural habits in 
a society is rarely emphasized in this part of the literature.  
In contrast, Lundvall and his colleagues at Aalborg treat specific institutions as parts of 
an “institutional setting or context” which shapes the learning process of firms and other 
organisations (Lundvall 1992). Institutions are then understood as “norms, habits and rules 
[that] are deeply ingrained in society and … play a major role in determining how people 
relate to each other and how they learn and use their knowledge” (Lundvall et al. 2002: 220). 
Here, the institutional setting includes both formal arrangements, such as laws, intellectual 
                                                 
26 The work of Johnson (1988, 1992, 1997 with Edquist) is a notable exception. 
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property rights regimes and labour market organizations, and informal arrangements such as 
the long-term or short-term perspectives of the agents and the nature of trust in transactions 
between the agents (Lundvall et al. 2002). Further, institutions are understood to possess the 
fundamental characteristic of “relative stability over time” (Lundvall 1992: 10). As a result, 
institutions provide the necessary stability and coherence required for ensuring the occurrence 
and success of innovation in firms. However, an understanding of institutions based on 
stability tends to overlook the importance of institutional change as a crucial part in the 
development of learning processes and in the broader systemic change. As we attempt to 
show later in this paper, institutional changes underlying the systemic transformation in newly 
industrialized countries of East Asia were central to industrial development. 
An early analysis of the relationship between technological and, aspects of, institutional 
change in innovation systems literature is Johnson (1988). Drawing on the work of North 
(1981), Lachman (1970) and other institutionalists, Johnson points to the centrality of 
institutional change in long-term economic growth and attempts to draw parallels between 
patterns of change in technologies and institutions. However, he does not explore the 
multiple dimensions of institutions and the way they interact with one another to structure 
innovative activity. Neither does he delve into the nature of informal institutions that 
condition processes of development and growth (see also Johnson 1992). 
Our interpretation of institutions resonates with and expands on the Aalborg 
conception of institutions (see Parto [2005a] for details). We propose a typology of 
institutions that ranges from informal to formal, and distinguishes between behavioural, 
cognitive, associative, regulative, and constitutive institutions. Drawing on elements of 
institutional economics, Edquist and Johnson (1997) have made a similar attempt to 
disaggregate institutions in an innovation system. They attempt to clear some of the 
conceptual ambiguity associated with the term institutions, and distinguish between economic 
and political; formal and informal; ‘hard’ and ‘soft’; and ‘basic’ and ‘supporting’ institutions. 
They also discuss at some length the many different types of relations between innovation 
and institutions. However, their analysis of institutional change based on some of their 
taxonomy does not adequately explain system transformation processes which are of prime 
importance from the perspective of developing economies. 
 
3.3 Transformation of Innovation Systems and Institutional Change 
Recent work has highlighted that analysing the transformation and evolution of systems 
of innovation is an essential task as technologies are becoming progressively more complex 
and new techno-economic paradigms are emerging and becoming intertwined with one 
another (Galli and Teubal 1997; Metcalfe 2000). Studying the design, spontaneous emergence, 
and transformation of institutions to deal with the rapidly changing technological scenarios is 
critical to the study of innovation. This is particularly important if we start from the premise 
that the emergence of new technologies is only partly conditioned by institutions that stabilize 
older technologies. 
Historical accounts of industrial development have demonstrated the crucial role played 
by national institutions in building competitive capabilities of firms within specific industries. 
Murmann’s (2003) analysis of the German synthetic dye industry in the late 19th and early 20th 
century shows that institutional change was essential for industrial and innovative success: in 
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particular, the creation of formal institutions such as new forms of public-private partnerships 
to “sponsor industrially relevant applied research” (Murmann 2003: 170); establishment of 
specialised research institutes; the formation of an effective German Chemical Industry 
Association and its crucial role in shaping new patent laws that forbid product patents on 
chemical products, but were severe on infringement of process patents. This perspective 
emphasizes the co-evolution of firm capabilities and technologies with institutional forms 
(Nelson 1994; Nelson and Sampat 2001; Murmann 2003).27 But as observed by Carlsson 
(2004), only a small percentage of existing studies on innovation systems have explicitly 
adopted a dynamic, historical perspective. Even a smaller percentage has analysed the 
formation of a new innovation system. Most importantly, an “analysis or discussion of the 
mechanisms through which institutions work”, much less of how they change, is extremely 
rare in the literature (Carlsson 2004). 
A dynamic perspective is crucial for change in economies locked-in to inefficient 
systems of innovation. Building of new innovation systems or transformation of older 
systems through ‘capacity building’ is a main objective of a good portion of development 
studies. However, the majority of applications of the IS framework to development attempt 
to transpose a well-functioning innovation-system model based on developed countries onto 
developing countries (Arocena and Sutz 2003). Such prescriptive analyses tend to overlook 
the specificity of the local institutional context and its (in)adequacy in fostering learning and 
innovativeness in firms. For example, in the innovation systems literature, there is relatively 
little analysis of institutions acting as obstacles to innovations as is commonly the case in 
underdeveloped countries. Corruption, incidentally, is one such (informal) institution. As a 
result, little insight is gained into the mechanisms of the necessary institutional change 
required for bridging the ‘learning divide’ (Arocena and Sutz 2000) or the technological divide 
(de la Rive Box 2001). Bridging this gap requires nurturing learning capabilities and creation 
of demand for new knowledge in less developed countries (Arocena and Sutz 2003; Johnson 
and Lundvall 2003). Further, an institutional context for facilitating positive feedback loops 
among heterogeneous actors is required to develop learning capabilities as a necessary feature 
of an innovation system. To this end, a detailed analysis of the less formal behavioural and 
cognitive institutions is highly beneficial in assessing the sufficiency of human and social 
capital to nurture innovative activity.  
Recently, a set of studies have developed the concept of ‘local productive arrangements’ 
to highlight the lack of articulation (from a learning/innovation perspective) among 
heterogeneous actors in local production agglomerations in Brazil and Uruguay (Cassiolato et 
al. 2003). The starting point of these studies is the prevalence of such arrangements in 
underdeveloped contexts, instead of dynamic production and innovation systems where 
“articulation, interaction, co-operation and learning processes” work well (Lastres et al. 2003, 
p. 23). The challenge then lies in designing and implementing policies that are likely to 
transform these inarticulate productive arrangements into well-functioning dynamic 
innovation systems. The first step in understanding the conditions that will promote such a 
                                                 
27 According to Murmann (2003: 22-23), “Two evolving populations co-evolve if and only if they both have 
significant causal impact on each other’s ability to persist. … Whether a coevolutionary process is beneficial or 
harmful for the parties involved depends on the particular causal relationship that links the parties; therefore, 
this relationship needs to be specified in the empirical analysis.” 
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transformation undoubtedly involves mapping the set of institutions and firm capabilities in 
the productive arrangements. The equally important second step concerns working with and 
changing relevant institutions in order to create the ‘right’ conditions. As a final point, 
pressures from the globalisation of production and, to a smaller extent, of innovation 
activities are forcing many nations and regions to reconsider older policy prescriptions. This 
scenario increases the urgency of studying transformation processes from an institutional 
perspective to better understand how existing institutions within national boundaries (can) 
change and adapt (Caracostas and Soete 1997).  
In the next section we attempt to draw attention to the largely neglected elements of 
innovation systems, i.e., institutions, by adapting concepts from old and new institutional 
economics. We provide details on how the innovation systems approach should be enriched 
to better inform public policy, with the assumption that even under post-Fordism and in 
current globalized trade regimes governments can play a significant role in shaping economic 
and industrial development.  
Finally, in order to develop ideas of institutional analysis in national innovation systems, 
we propose a theoretical representation of development and growth, similar to the one 
adopted by Dosi et al. (1994) and Saviotti and Pyka (2004). This representation takes both 
‘qualitative change’ and ‘structural change’ of an economic system into consideration. 
Structural change occurring at the sectoral level goes hand in hand with the qualitative 
changes taking place at lower levels of the system, such as at individual cognitive levels, in 
firm-level behaviour and in other organisations. Developing a coherent account of change 
requires paying attention to the specific characteristics of institutions that structure inter-
relations at different levels; intertwine social, economic and political systems; and act as 
mechanisms or channels through which governance is exercised at different scales. To do 
this, as outlined below we need to superimpose an arbitrary division between levels, systems, 
and scales. The process requires an understanding the entire range of formal and informal 
institutions. 
In addition, drawing on the interpretative framework suggested by Kim and von 
Tunzelmann (1998) we propose analysis and interpretation of development processes through 
‘alignment’ of different levels of interaction at different territorial scales of governance, i.e., 
sub-national, national, and supra-national. For example, the development of Taiwanese or 
South Korean IT industries may be explained through the role of policies that have been 
oriented to the alignment of external relations, the national innovation system and the local 
technological system. In other words, the process of production and innovation taking place 
inside the Taiwanese firms must be viewed in conjunction with their local institutional setting, 
the relevant economic sector, the national system of innovation, and international 
pressures/relations. 
 
4.0 Institutions and Institutional Analysis 
In a recent book with examples on outcomes of development prescriptions from many 
tropical countries, Easterly (2002) argues that development failures are not due to economic 
failures but rather due to the (institutional) context of applications. Conducting institutional 
analysis to investigate success or failure in economic development should go beyond focusing 
on specific institutions such as government agencies, business associations, or cultural values. 
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It should pay attention to an economy’s full range of identifiable formal and informal 
institutions, including networks and associations, to examine their inter-relations; reinforcing 
or neutralizing mechanisms; their relative significance within the system; and the different 
degree to which each institution may be influenced through policy or other intervention. 
Institutional analysis, as we see it, bases itself on multiple disciplines to capture multiple 
causalities and relies on substantial use of narratives as illustrative accompaniments to formal 
models. 
Indispensable in understanding multiple causalities are narratives from different social 
scientific perspectives including history, sociology, and political science. Economic historians 
have provided systematic views of economic development in different eras (Kuznets 1966; 
von Tunzelmann 1978; 1995). Historians of technology tell us how new technologies (or 
technological systems) emerge and are subsequently improved and diffused, through the rich 
detail in their case studies of specific technologies (see for example Constant 1980; Hughes 
1983). Sociologists and political scientists have illuminated the role of power and the nature 
of interactions through formal and informal institutions between different interest groups that 
determine the choice of a particular technology over others and shape subsequent trajectories 
of technological development (see Bijker 1995; Winner 1986). Economists can develop 
formalized causalities and explore outcomes based on modelling quantifiable relations 
between carefully selected factors, or develop theoretical frameworks to make sense of 
diverse interactions between the components of an economic system and between the system 
and its environment. A basic premise of this perspective is that innovation, industrial 
development, growth, and more generally economic activity do not occur in a socio-political 
vacuum. 
The “interconnectedness” and inevitable complexity implied in our premise leads us to 
focus on two aspects of industrial development. First, because of complexity, industrial 
development policy making is based on a series of simplifying assumptions. Second, industrial 
development policy can include more or fewer actors/stakeholders. One key assumption that 
has returned to dominate the thinking behind much of economic policy making is the belief 
that there is a direct and unidirectional relationship between business and societal well being. 
That is, if business firms do well, they create more wealth and generate more jobs. This was 
certainly true of the post WWII years in Europe when corporate tax rates were substantially 
higher than they have been since the early 1990s and when the state deemed its business to 
ensure societal welfare by providing public services. Starting in the mid-1980s, concerted 
efforts have been made by an increasing number of governments to offload most of their 
‘costly’ public service functions and for providing new impetus for economic growth. Much 
of the discussion on the move from government to governance, at least in the context of 
North America and northwestern Europe, has referenced the delegation of formal state 
functions to non- and quasi-governmental entities, accompanied with neoliberalism as a 
dominant state political tendency to facilitate the move from the “Keynesian welfare national 
state” to a “Schumpeterian workfare regime” (Jessop 1993, 2003). 
On the issue of inclusion of actors in the policy making process, the degree of 
inclusiveness is determined by the ‘mode of governance’, which may be more or less 
hierarchical. Under the umbrella of governance there have been numerous discussions since 
the early 1980s among policy makers and social scientists alike on collaboration, cooperation, 
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and coordination. This discussion was partly spurred by the belief that interdependencies 
among actors in markets, networks, and hierarchies have increased both in number and 
strength. If we simplify the notion of governance to mean ‘the way human communities (i.e., 
organizations, polities, and cross-polity regions) organize themselves’ (Parto 2005b), it follows 
that studies of the economic system need to include many different kinds of actors who have 
to relate to one another, and who all contend for (or defend) a piece of the proverbial pie, 
action, or power. A human community organizes itself through formal and informal 
institutions that collectively act as structuring phenomena. But, this begs the question: what 
are these institutions and where are they manifest?  
 
4.1 Institutions 28 
Our starting point is that the institutions through which governance (including 
economic development policy-making) is exercised are reflections of learning in its broadest 
societal sense. However, once established, institutions structure (constrain and facilitate) 
further learning in a continuous and interactive auto-catalytic process. While the interest in 
institutions of governance by economists and political scientists faded somewhat in the mid-
20th Century, it remained continuously present in sociology and is reflected in works of 
Cooley, Durkheim, Spencer and Sumner around the turn of the 19th century, to Weber (1924), 
Hughes (1939), Davis (1949), Parsons (1990), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Jessop (2001), 
and Scott (2001) among numerous others. Many of these writers have been influenced by, or 
rebelled against, ideas put forward by Marx in mid 19th century. The resulting diversity of 
conceptualizations of institutions originating in sociology, political science and economics has 
generated a literature on institutions that is extensive but difficult to operationalize. 
A close look at the many definitions of institutions reveals three important 
distinguishing features. First, some definitions underline the territorial scale of governance 
(Krätke 1999, Ostrom 1999, Young 1994, 2002). Second, a number of these definitions refer 
to institutions as being manifest in individual behaviour in the society at large (Hamilton 
1932, Parsons 1990, Krätke 1999, Veblen 1919), within organizations (Commons 1924, 
March and Olsen 1984, Coriat and Dosi 1998), among organizations (Ostrom 1999), and 
among nations (Young 1994, 2002). Finally, one can detect varying degrees of emphasis on 
social, economic, or political aspects of institutions. What comes through this grouping of 
definitions of institutions is that they can be more or less formal phenomena that structure 
different levels of inter-relation, territorial scales of governance, and systems (or “spheres”, in 
the words of Max Weber). Viewed in this multi-layered fashion, the task of unpacking the 
complexity presented by the diverse definitions of institutions becomes more manageable. A 
summary of the working definitions for levels, scales, and systems is provided in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Levels, Scales, and Systems 
Levels of inter-
relation 
 
Individual: Among individuals at large based on interpersonal 
interdependence where many actors are involved. 
Organizational: Within organizations to secure internal cohesion and 
among organizations to ensure adaptability of an organization to be 
compatible with others in its operational entity (e.g. in a production chain). 
Further, an organization’s de facto independence but social interdependence 
on other organizations. 
Societal: Among operationally autonomous (or closed) functional systems 
each with its own autopoietic codes, programmes, institutional logic and 
interests in self-reproduction. 
Scales of 
Governance 
Local (subnational), national, international (between nationally constituted, 
functionally differentiated institutional orders), transnational (passing 
through national boundaries), and global (covering the globe as a whole). 
Systems 
A society may be defined in terms of its social, economic, political, and 
ecological spheres or systems. A subsystem contains parts of all systems.  
Source: Parto (2005a) 
“Levels of inter-relation” is borrowed from sociology and refers to inter-relations at the 
individual, organizational, and societal levels. “Scales of governance” is used in sociology, 
political science, and administrative studies to capture the territorial dimension of governance. 
“Systems” is a notion borrowed from studies of systems dynamics (and from Weber’s notion 
of spheres) and is used to bring interconnectedness into perspectives of governance. The 
notion of systems is particularly useful in dealing with complex and multi-dimensional 
processes such as those underlying innovation, which require studying economic activity in 
specific contexts.  
The categorization in terms of levels, scales, and systems is constructed and employed 
to come to terms with the complexity of the fundamental question: how do we account for 
institutions in analyses of policy aimed at societal change? Answering this question has 
important implications for further research and policy. In research, careful categorization of 
institutions based on levels, scales, and systems enables one to investigate the same problem 
or research question in different contexts, expect different findings due to context-specific 
institutional landscapes, and identify the most relevant factors or variables in a given context. 
In policy making, an in-depth appreciation of the collective role of context-specific 
institutions is likely to minimize the possibility of designing unsuitable policies or setting 
unrealistic policy objectives. And, in policy implementation, institutional analysis can provide 
a better understanding of why in some contexts some policies succeed more than others in 
meeting their objectives.  
The categorization in Table 1 provides a useful basis for working with the notion of 
institutions. Applying the levels-scales-systems perspective to institutions yields a typology of 
institutions as follows: 
Behavioural: Institutions as standardized (recognizable) social habits – manifest in 
activities of individuals and groups as shared social norms 
Cognitive: Institutions as mental models and constructs or definitions – based on 
values and embedded in culture 
                                                                                                                                                   
28 This section draws extensively on Parto (2005a, 2005b). 
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Associative: Institutions as mechanisms facilitating prescribed or privileged interaction 
among different private and public interests 
Reuglative: Institutions as prescriptions and proscriptions 
Constitutive: Institutions setting the bounds of social relations 
As important as this disaggregation of institutions is in identifying them, more 
important is the range of formality and scope that it depicts, particularly when we view 
institutions as phenomena that bind together and stabilize inter-relations at different levels, 
governance at different scales, and systems (see Figure 1).29 
 
Figure 1. Scope and Formality of Institutions 
Behavioural 
Institutions 
Cognitive 
Institutions 
Associative 
Institutions 
Regulative 
Institutions 
Constitutive 
Institutions 
Low Societal 
Scope and 
Formality 
   
High Societal 
Scope and 
Formality 
Source: Parto (2005b) 
 
Institutional analysis to inform policy in a mode of governance committed to nurturing 
innovation and economic growth, for example, should begin with the specification of the 
context (comprising levels, scales, and systems) in which the institutions are to be studied. 
Further, it requires differentiating between formal and informal institutions since different 
levels of formality (tangibility and scope) require different methods, or mixes of methods, of 
analysis and policy approach. It is important to distinguish between each institution type and 
its catalyst(s). For example, the introduction of a new regulation on borrowing is not an 
institution but a catalyst. The catalyst may, or may not, result in an institution embedded in 
society as a structuring phenomenon. If the regulation is not enforced and complied with 
widely in the society, it is not, for our intents and purposes, instituted. Similarly, an associative 
institution may come to be as a result of an alliance forming between private or private and 
public interests. If the alliance persists and actively structures inter-relations, it can then be 
said to be an associative institution. The next section sketches out how the typology in Figure 
1 may be applied to studies of economic development.  
 
4.2 Institutional Analysis 
So far in this paper we have provided descriptive accounts on theorising in 
development and growth in economics and innovation systems literatures. The two literatures 
share a focus on economic growth though innovation system scholars have also paid 
attention to issues of capacity building for development in a variety of contexts. The 
introduction of context specificity is a welcome addition in framing the question of why some 
economic conglomerations, e.g., regions or nations, are more successful and enjoy higher and 
more sustained growth than others. However, we have also indicated that the treatment of 
the role of institutions in the literature on innovation systems does not sufficiently explain 
why some regional or national economies fare better than others, let alone provide insights on 
                                                 
29 See Parto (2005a) for a detailed discussion of institutions at different levels, scales, and systems. 
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steps that can be taken in a given context to foster an institutional transformation. In the 
preceding section we articulated a framework for a more in-depth understanding of the role 
of formal and informal institutions in understanding processes of economic development and 
growth. 
In the remainder of this section we extract elements from the case studies of Taiwan 
and South Korea in attempt to illustrate how our framework may be applied to incorporate 
more contextual depth for understanding the different sources of growth and the interactions 
between them. On a cautionary note, our illustration through a re-reading of the two case 
studies carried out by others is far from conclusive and must be buttressed by future detailed 
case studies conducted using the institutional framework presented here. The discussion 
below draws on the in-depth case studies developed by Wade (1990), Hassink  (1994), Kim 
(1997), Amsden (2001), and Chang (2003). Specifically, we attempt to superimpose the 
institutional typology outlined above onto the two cases.30 
Taiwan 
From 1895 until World War II, Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule. The Japanese 
built up a well-functioning education system and invested in health and infrastructure. After 
the Chinese took over in 1945, the provincial government of Taiwan had exercised a 
significantly higher degree of autonomy than other Chinese provinces under the Nationalist 
government’s rule. This autonomy was reflected in a lower rate of inflation than the 
mainland, a separate currency (instituted in 1945), and an independent monetary policy as well 
as policies on trade and transport. With the arrival of the central government in Taiwan after 
the Chinese Revolution of 1949 a period adjustment and reorganization ensued: a new 
administrative structure was defined to accommodate the provincial administrators and the 
Nationalist apparatus. 
The central government gradually assumed control with support from the United States 
through development aid and the establishment of the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB) 
in 1951 which acted to neutralize and eventually eliminate (in 1953) the provincial 
government’s Production Control Board. From 1953 ESB formally assumed responsibility for 
preparing plans, formulating monetary, fiscal, and trade policy; coordinating military and 
civilian expenditures, formulating the expenditure budget for the counterpart funds; screening 
private investment applications, and approving all large loans from domestic banks as well as 
all foreign loans. Two more government agencies were set up in 1953. The Foreign Exchange 
and Trade Commission was charged to set exchange rates, allocate foreign exchange, and 
govern over other trade policy issues. The Commission made foreign currency available at 
below the market rate to the domestic producers. The second agency, the Industrial 
Development Commission was responsible for identifying industrial projects and help with 
start-ups. The two agencies played an instrumental role in encouraging the emergence of a 
domestic production base. 
It would be naïve to view the transformation of Taiwan from an underdeveloped to a 
developed economy as smooth. In addition to conflict between the provincial and the central 
government administrators, the process was also riddled with conflicts over the direction for 
                                                 
30 The case of Taiwan is largely derived from Wade (1990) and to a lesser extent from Amsden (2001). The 
information on South Korea is drawn from Hassink (1994), Kim (1997), and Chang (2003).  
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economic policy fought by two rival factions within the government. The first group stood 
for a balanced budget, no trade deficit, more consumer goods imports and fewer capital 
goods imports. This group also wanted more public sector control of economic activity and a 
dominant role for public enterprises. The second group argued for reduced government 
control of foreign trade and increased competition among domestic firms. The first group 
controlled the banking system and was hence able to frustrate the attempts by the second 
group to bolster a flourishing domestic private sector supported by cheap and accessible 
funds. However, with technical and monetary support from the United States, the second 
group was able to secure the necessary funds to set up a number of successful private sector 
ventures including a plastics factory, a window glass factory, and a man-made fibre factory. 
Perhaps more significantly the second group supported the Taiwanese president’s belief that 
retaking the mainland was the number one objective but it could only be done once Taiwan 
had built up a strong industrially prosperous economy: Such an economy would unite the 
mainlanders with the Taiwanese in rallying behind the president. 
The quest for building a domestic industrial base drew on support from mostly 
American-trained engineers and wartime public servants keen on expanding the private sector 
and reducing the size of state-owned enterprises. A process of adjustment started in 1958, 
including significant personnel changes in top government jobs, to make Taiwan the 
showplace for the free enterprise system in Asia. ‘Industrializers’ assumed important positions 
in the government and took control of ESB. Later in 1958, ESB was dissolved and its 
responsibilities were given to the already existing Council on U.S. Aid (CUSA). Reforms that 
followed included the unification of exchange rate, easing of import and export controls on 
many items, more accessible loans to private industry, and increased incentives for exporting. 
The incentives for export consisted of greater availability of export finance and of duty 
rebates on the import of items to be processed into exports. 
South Korea 
As with Taiwan, Korea’s achievements are rooted in its history and a series of catalytic 
events. In pre-modern times, Korea was renowned for the wealth of its educational 
institutions and achievements in sciences. While under Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 
1945, Korea’s manufacturing sector grew annually at an average of 9.7 percent. The Japanese 
also developed relatively sophisticated fiscal and financial systems and invested heavily in 
education, infrastructure, and health. However, from the fall of Japanese colonial rule in 1945 
to the end of the Korean War in 1953 South Korea had lost two-thirds of its industrial 
capacity (World Bank 1993:127). The most recent transformation of South Korea from a 
largely agrarian to a highly successful industrial economy began in earnest in the early 1960s. 
Until the mid 1990s the average growth rate was 9 percent, raising GNP per capita in 1995 
prices from $87 in 1962 to $8,483. The underlying determinants of this transformation have 
been identified as the turbulence created by the Korean War, a historically strong role of the 
government, land reform, creation of large export-oriented conglomerates (chaebols), Korean 
work ethics and, as with Taiwan, Confucian cultural values and the geopolitics of American 
anti-communist foreign policy. 
According to Kim (1997), Korea’s success in industrialization is attributable, to a large 
extent, to Park Chung Hee who seized power in 1961 and was deeply committed to 
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transform Korea from a subsistent agricultural economy into an industrialized one. He 
created a highly centralized and strong government to plan and implement his vision of the 
new Korea. Heavy-handedly, the government directed industrial activity through licensing. 
The commercial banks were nationalized and “savings” for much needed investments were 
created by borrowing heavily from abroad. Park’s military style moral values and discipline 
were reflected in how Korea’s industrial development was regulated through a system of 
rewards and sanctions. To set an example, undesirable rent seeking behaviour by private 
sector actors under the previous regime (1948-1960) was dealt with threats of prosecution 
early on during Park’s rule. 
Other factors with significant role in the transformation of Korea include the 
institutional legacy of Japanese colonial rule (as with Taiwan) from 1910 to 1945. Many 
Korean technocrats were Japanese trained and capable of emulating Japanese-style 
organizational and economic management. Following the Japanese model Korea pursued an 
industrial policy that nurtured big business through subsidies and other incentives to become 
an engine of technological learning. The Korean government emphasized export orientation, 
challenging the private sector to create self-induced but creative crises, and promoted 
technologically advanced heavy and chemical industries while repressing labour unions. It was 
not until the late 1970s that the impact of Korean imports on foreign, particularly American, 
markets was felt and viewed as a threat to American domestic industry. Korea in the 
meantime had managed to establish a solid, export-oriented domestic economy consisting of 
a substantial traditional base including auto/auto-parts production, shipbuilding and set the 
foundation for a cutting-edge electronics sector. 
Korea’s successes came under strain during the 1980s due to a general slow-down in 
the world economy: rising labour costs despite the government repression of organized 
labour and increased competition from other newly industrializing countries; reluctance of 
developed countries to transfer technology to Korea; and international pressure to establish 
and enforce a strict copyright and patent laws system. Stricter copyright and patenting system 
effectively ended imitative reverse-engineering of foreign products, a practice that had made a 
significant contribution in Korea’s technological learning.  
The pressures on the Korean economy during the 1980s prompted the government to 
introduce a series of structural measures to sustain economic growth. A policy of economic 
democratization was put in place through the Fair Trade Act of 1980 to curb the powers of 
the chaebols which by then had grown into monopolies that partook in creating scarcities, 
price gouging, and predatory behaviour in the domestic market. The Act was revised in the 
1990s to encourage the chaebols to compete in the emerging liberalized global market. The 
government also focused its attention on promoting SMEs which had been a neglected 
component in managing the economy during the 1960s and 1970s. 
The development trajectories of Taiwan and Korea are attributable to two main factors: 
a grand vision of the country as a modern industrialized state by its rulers, and geopolitics. In 
the case of Taiwan, the 1958 air and sea battles with China over the possession of the 
Quemoy island prompted the United States to  persuade the Taiwanese president to adopt a 
defensive stance and that Taiwan would not attempt to recapture the mainland. This 
agreement with the United States allowed the Taiwanese government to focus more attention 
on economic development instead of militarisation. Further, the agreement coincided with 
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important personnel changes within the government, driven by internal politics rather than a 
conscious plan. The net outcome of these developments was a government committed to 
building an industrial base and maintaining a market-driven production system. Finally, there 
were significant amounts of U.S. Aid to scaffold the government’s efforts. In the case of 
Korea, it is widely accepted that proximity to China and North Korea played quite significant 
roles in making South Korea a key recipient of “favours” and development aid from the 
United States. 
 
Table 2 – Typology of Institutions in Taiwan and Korea31 
Institution Type Taiwan Korea 
Behavioural 
− Confucianism (respect for 
hierarchical structures and valuing 
hard work) 
− Confucianism 
Cognitive 
− Importance of Education, 
Industrialization, Mass Production, 
and Competitiveness (as opposed to 
welfare as the source of well being)a 
− Importance of Knowledge-based 
Assets 
− Export Orientation  
− Importance of Education, 
Industrialization, and Mass 
Production (Chaebols), and 
Competitiveness 
− Importance of Knowledge-based 
Assets 
− Export Orientation 
Associative 
− Industrial Associations 
− Government-business associations 
through Deliberation Councils 
− Farmers and Irrigation Associations 
− Industrial Associations 
− Government-business association 
through Export Promotion 
Meetings 
Regulative 
− Selective industrial and trade policies 
(SIT) 
− Regulations 
− State-owned Enterprises 
− Regulations to cap payment of 
licensing fees and royalties for 
imported technology 
− SIT 
− Regulations 
− Economic Planning Board 
− State-owned Enterprises 
− Nationalized Commercial Banks 
− Provision of Targeted Loans 
− Tariff and Tax Exemptions, 
Accelerated Depreciation  
− Linking issuance of import 
licences to export performance 
Constitutive 
− Land Reform 
− Martial Law (until 1987) 
− Democratization (after 1987) 
− Property Rights Regime 
− Land Reform 
− Property Rights Regime 
− Democratization (after 1987) 
 
                                                 
31 As stated earlier, grouping institutions into these five types can be done only very loosely and for the purposes 
of taking account of the levels, scales, and systems at and through which institutions are manifest. The type 
attributed to each identified institution denotes the main, rather than the only, characteristic of the institution. 
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The institutional transformation underlying the ascent of Taiwan and South Korea to 
the status of newly industrialized economies can be explained through the typology of 
institutions introduced in the preceding section. Hassink (1994) suggests that Taiwan’s (and 
South Korea’s) success is due to a combination timely policy making combined with historical 
and cultural factors. For a long time Taiwan was under the colonial rule of Japan which ended 
with the Second World War. Chowdhury and Islam (1993:35) have argued that Taiwan’s 
economy benefited significantly from this period of colonization. In the case of Korea, much 
of the industrial base and infrastructure created by the Japanese was destroyed during the 
Korean War. A new industrial base was to be created during the 1950s and 1960s through 
generous development aid from the United States. Certainly, this provision of development 
aid and industrial expertise was guided significantly by geopolitics: predominantly the 
determination to fight communism on all fronts. 
The availability of development aid, though necessary, is not sufficient to explain 
Taiwan’s success in industrialization. According to Chowdhury and Islam (1993) and Vogel 
(1991), cultural values based on Confucianism played an important role in providing a stable 
environment for industrial policy implementation. Confucianism emphasizes the value of 
hard work, self-cultivation, self-improvement, social harmony and cooperation. At an 
individual level these values translated into attention to education as a basis for success and 
respect for authority. While difficult to prove, one may conjecture that the combination of 
cultural values and large development aid are largely responsible for Taiwan’s success. The 
catalyst for these two important factors to work, however, has been a reflexive interventionist 
industrial/economic development policy. Over time, the interventionist role of the 
government has co-evolved with changes in the internal and external environments.32  
Government intervention has been aimed at creating a stable business environment in 
which the markets function efficiently. Establishing a property rights regime, labour and 
capital markets, low inflation through balanced government budget and strict monetary 
policy, as well as absorbing unfavourable externalities and ensuring a relatively high degree of 
foreign competition through liberalized trade are among the institutional measures taken by 
the government to manage economic development. The conflicts inherent in instituting these 
measures were checked by the hierarchical and authoritarian socio-political system and 
through sustained attempts by the government to engage business interests in economic 
development policy making. 
Adopting the multi-dimensional institutional perspective as we have proposed in this 
paper emphasizes the key role played by the existing institutional landscape in facilitating the 
transition from ‘underdeveloped’ to ‘developed’ through industrialization. As we noted in our 
brief reviews of Taiwan and Korea, significant (formal) institutional capacity was 
accompanied in each case with a host of culturally-based and historically contingent informal 
institutions. Both the Taiwanese and the Korean society had the benefit of longstanding 
institutions that effectively structured inter-relations at all levels. Respect for power and 
                                                 
32 Our use of the term “interventionist” encompasses both the liberal and paternal approaches to economic 
management. A less regulated market does not mean that the government is not intervening. Rather, it implies 
that the government is intervening in the workings of the market by not taking action while remaining very 
much in charge as governments of Taiwan and South Korea, for example, have been doing since before their 
recent industrialization processes began. 
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hierarchy combined with ethical values on the virtues of hard work were and continue to be 
important behavioural institutions, indispensable for societal transformation of the type 
experienced in Taiwan and Korea. Aspiring to become self-reliant and economically 
prosperous fits well with what we have described as cognitive institutions or mental models. 
The importance of private and private-public collaborative arrangements as key to the 
economic transformation of Taiwan and Korea has been recognized and widely documented. 
In our typology we referred to these partnerships as associative institutions. Both governments 
actively intervened in the working of the market by introducing regulations and later 
removing them in attempts to guide and steer the behaviour of economic agents. These 
dynamic policy making efforts were simultaneously responsive to changes in the external 
environment and to the business interests inside the country. The interaction between the 
private sector and the government generated measures that broadly regulated interactions and 
transactions. In our typology we refer to these measures as regulative institutions. Finally, both 
countries underwent land reform and heavy-handed military rule. The military’s grip was 
loosened significantly in 1987 in both countries. In response to pressures from the industrial 
North, both countries established intellectual property rights regimes to address objections 
and threats of economic sanctions by the North. Since these measures set “the bounds of 
social relations” we classify them as constitutive institutions. 
 
5.0 Conclusion and future directions 
Based on our reviews, we have illustrated that the somewhat crude representations of 
economic activity through the lenses of orthodox growth models have been significantly 
improved upon by heterodox, mainly evolutionary, approaches in economics which have 
drawn attention to the non-macro elements. Nelson and Winter (1982) and others have 
underlined the importance of innovative activity at the firm level while technological 
innovation at the meso level has been studied from a systemic perspective by Lundvall (1992) 
and others through studies of innovation systems. The latter studies have drawn attention to 
the role of institutions without, however, providing a sufficient basis for defining the 
necessary attributes and weights to distinguish among different types of institutions. 
That technology and institutions “matter” in economic growth is a given in all 
orthodox and heterodox economic theories. Most post-exogenous arguments about growth 
share, to varying degrees, the perspective that economic development is a complex, 
multifaceted process; and that technological change, firm behaviour, and institutional 
characteristics collectively shape the development trajectories that generate growth. The 
research agenda that has emerged from this perspective is wide ranging and in its specialized 
form can be rather overwhelming to the average reader or policy maker without significant 
intellectual investment. We have argued in this paper that formal models of economic growth 
by themselves cannot illuminate the development process satisfactorily, particularly in 
providing explanation for institutional change that undergirds economic development. The 
New Growth Theory has in most cases marginalized institutions, which are sometimes 
assumed to justify the behaviour of the modelled variables or equation properties (Romer 
1994; Mankiw et al. 1992). The evolutionary approach of Nelson and Winter (1982) has 
concentrated on micro behaviour at the firm-level and on the role of technological change. 
Even then as noted by Silverberg and Verspagen (1995) in a review of evolutionary growth 
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theory, our knowledge of the underlying dynamics of economic development/growth has not 
increased significantly. The Kaldorian approach introduces some institutional features at the 
macro level, but the focus on sectoral dynamics essentially boils them down to a demand 
feature and its cumulative causation effects. The role of technology and innovation at the 
meso-level has been closely examined through studies of industrial clusters/districts, and 
innovation systems at different scales, e.g., regional or national. These studies have 
demonstrated that innovative capabilities of firms depend upon the institutional context, but 
their focus has largely been on mapping the set of supporting formal institutions. As a result, 
an in-depth analysis of the gradual formal- and informal-institutional change occurring in 
parallel with technological and organizational change remains elusive. A few scholars have 
attempted to explore parts of this puzzle (Zysman 1994; Petit 1999; Katz 2004), but a 
comprehensive study that gives equal importance to all pieces of the puzzle, especially 
institutions, is yet to be attempted. 
As we have tried to illustrate in this paper, underlining the centrality of institutions in 
economic (and innovative) activity does not imply that all institutions are important all of the 
time. We have stressed the importance of identifying the institutional dimensions of the 
industrial development and growth as a first step in determining which institutions are 
observable for research purposes and controllable from a policy making perspective. This 
approach, while leaving room for random events and unintended outcomes, can lead us to 
better understand why as well as how change occurs. The approach is particularly useful in 
situations where the societal and/or policy intent is to effect change toward a preferred socio-
economic state, including development and sustained growth, or toward more desirable 
technologies or technological regimes, for example. 
Amsden’s (2001) “Assets Approach to Industrialization” comes closest in attempts to 
provide a frame of analysis to capture development and growth dynamics over time without 
losing sight of “non-economic” factors. We have argued that these non-economic factors are 
in fact a set of pre-existing institutions and new institutions that are products of deliberate 
change induced largely through government intervention. A main feature of this argument is 
our take on institutions as structuring phenomena and manifest at different levels of inter-
relation, scales of governance, and systems. A second important feature is that institutions are 
reflections of learning in its broadest societal sense by individuals and organizations. 
Institutions can be products of societal self-organizing processes and agent-induced actions 
including public policy. A major driving force in the great leaps forward by Taiwan and South 
Korea in economic development and growth has been policy learning. In both cases, a 
progressively sophisticated approach to economic development was adopted: from the 
relatively “simple” import substitution policies of post WWII years to export-oriented 
industrialization through industrial policies of the late 1960s to the 1980s, and eventually to 
the present-day innovation policies. 
In our brief reviews of the case of Taiwan and South Korea we have attempted to show 
that the advances made by the two countries to become newly industrialized economies 
would not have been possible without the integrated webs of formal and informal 
institutions, which served as the foundation for implementing strategies to encourage local 
scientific and technological activity. The case studies presented in this paper are too brief and 
preliminary, and we suspect most readers find the case study material wanting for additional 
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details on the institutional transformations described for Taiwan and South Korea. Such 
details are necessary for constructing a convincing ‘whole’ of the stories of success and failure 
in economic development. The challenge lies in conducting these detailed case studies 
without losing sight of the full picture, even when the full picture complicates a modelled 
reality.  
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